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Abstract 
This chapter will examine the impact which law’s changing conception of 
corporeality has had on people with intersex bodies. Historically, in medieval and 
renaissance times, the law recognised three types of bodies as conferring legal status: 
male, female and hermaphrodite. Contemporaneous to increased specialisation in medical 
knowledge about hermaphroditic conditions during Victorian times, the laws governing 
the registration of persons were introduced: intersex is notable in its absence from these 
legal provisions. This coincidence of events is analysed and it is argued that it signals the 
beginning of the erosion of intersex from legal consciousness. Such a contention is further 
strengthened by an examination of the case law which has directly addressed the 
categorisation of bodies as either male or female. The results of this consideration reveal 
the disappearance of ‘intersex’ from legal consciousness. 
 The continuing importance of the dual role of the birth certificate as both a 
historical ‘snapshot’ of events at a particular moment and as a crucial and current 
identification document becomes apparent. It is argued that adherence to a binary 
understanding of gender actively discriminates against intersex people. Finally, the 
chapter considers the re-emergence of the historical paradigm of self-declaration of 
gender identity for intersex people. 
  
Investigating Intersex  
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The question of how the legal gender of a person ought to be determined has received 
considerable attention over the past decade in Ireland. There have been two High Court 
decisions, a Declaration of Incompatibility with Ireland’s obligations under the law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an advisory group report to 
Government, two Private Members Bills introduced in the Oireachtas, and the publication 
of the general scheme of a Government sponsored piece of legislation which has been 
subjected to Joint Oireachtas Committee scrutiny prior to official drafting.1 This analysis 
has revealed that, currently, the law categorises bodies as either male or female. Yet, the 
existence of intersex in the natural world is commonly accepted. There are many plant 
and animal species that exhibit intersex traits.2 That there are also intersex people is 
unsurprising.3 
As a term, ‘intersex’, is becoming more familiar yet it is often misconstrued as 
referring to ambiguous sexual orientation or the transition period between one gender and 
the other for transgender people. ‘Intersex’ describes those bodies that cannot be 
categorised as either male or female as their sexual or reproductive anatomy does not fit 
the typical definitions of those categories. It is not always immediately apparent when a 
body is intersex. Thus while some people are identified as intersex in early childhood due 
to ambiguous genitalia, others are recognised at a later stage in development. It is not 
unusual for intersex to become manifest at puberty, when seeking assistance with fertility 
difficulties or even on autopsy when intersex at a genetic level can become obvious.  
When discussing intersex language becomes loaded. Therefore it is appropriate to 
pause to explain the linguistic choices taken in drafting this chapter. Historically the term 
‘hermaphrodite’ was employed, however due to the associations with the myth of 
Hermaphroditus and consequent resonance of fantasy, this term has fallen out of favour. 
Thus ‘intersex’ was preferred.4 The linguistic difficulty with the term ‘intersex’ is that it 
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presupposes that there are two defining sexes and that this third category is a hybrid which 
exists between the two. This kind of assumption is limited and eschews recognising the 
complexity of sex, gender and identity. Since 2006, the term ‘disorder of sexual 
development’ (DSD) has been used in addition to or in place of ‘intersex’ for the very 
reasons outlined above.5 This latest term can be contested as it presumes an underlying 
disorder and that there is something intrinsically wrong with the intersex body requiring 
it to be fixed as either male or female.6 It can be argued that using this term perpetrates 
the medicalisation and problematisiation of something which is not inherently medically 
problematic.7 Generally this chapter will use the term ‘intersex’ save where it is more 
appropriate, particularly in a historical context, to employ another term such as 
‘hermaphrodite’. 
 
Historical Hermaphrodites 
Intersex is not a new or recent phenomenon. There have always been intersex individuals 
in human society. Through an exploration of how society, the law and the medical 
profession have interacted with intersex people throughout the ages the repositioning of 
hermaphrodites, largely unnoticed and unremarked in history, as, from the time of the 
Enlightenment, objects for close scrutiny will be highlighted.  Increased interest caused 
hermaphrodites to be treated as curios both for the paying public at shows and fairs,8 as 
well as for the medical community.9 This visibility contrasts sharply with the virtual 
invisibility of intersex people in the twentieth century until the advent of the intersex 
advocacy movement in the mid-1990s. In relating the history of hermaphrodites and 
situating it within the context of the history of sexuality, the chapter will also attempt to 
tease out why these changes in visibility occurred.  
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The Age of Antiquity 
The word ‘hermaphrodite’ comes from the story of Hermaphroditus. This story was told 
by Ovid in his book Metamorphoses. When the nymph Salmacis saw Hermaphroditus, 
the son of the gods Hermes and Aphrodite, swimming in her lake she fell rapturously in 
love with him and implored the gods that they never be separated. The gods, with their 
usual sardonic sense of humour, took her at her word and their two bodies were fused into 
one. ‘They two were two no more, nor man, nor woman – One body then that neither 
seemed and both.’10 
Hermaphrodites were more than mere myths. Hippocrates, the father of western 
medicine held that a uterus had seven cells.11 If a foetus gestated in one of the three cells 
on the left it would develop as a male. If it developed in one of the three cells on the right 
it would be a female. Finally, if it developed in the middle cell, it would be a 
hermaphrodite and combine traits of both males and females. Therefore Hippocrates 
considered that hermaphrodites were a third sex in a spectrum of sexes.  Aristotle, by 
contrast, viewed males and females as polar opposites without any intermediate forms. 
His explanation for the existence of hermaphrodites was as follows; extra sexual organs, 
like extra fingers or toes, result from an excess of generative matter; too much for one 
embryo and not enough for two.12 
 
Medieval and Renaissance Attitudes 
In Medieval and Renaissance times being either a man or a woman affected one’s 
legal status in society. Men were entitled to own property and to vote, women were not. 
On the issue of the hermaphrodite, Henry de Bracton wrote that mankind could be 
classified as male, female or hermaphrodite and that a hermaphrodite is classified with 
male or female according to the predominance of the sexual organs.13  This was still the 
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legal position during renaissance times when Lord Coke writing on succession laws 
noted: ‘Every heire is either a male, or female or an hermaphrodite, that is both male and 
female. And an hermaphrodite (which is also called Androgynous) shall be heire, either 
as male or female, according to that kind of the sexe which doth prevaile.’14  Maimonides, 
a Jewish rabbi, doctor, theologian, lawyer, provides in his The Book of Women a detailed 
diagnostic procedure for determining whether a person was a man, woman or a 
hermaphrodite.15 According to Maimonides, a hermaphrodite could become betrothed to 
marry either a man or a woman. Such an engagement, being suspect, would require a 
judgment before the marriage could take place. 
Although in theory this appears inclusive, as if it would enable a hermaphrodite to declare 
himself male, for example, and then to live his life without interruption from the State, 
the reality for hermaphrodites could be different. Daston and Park recount the tale of 
Marie/Marin from Renaissance France.16 Raised a female, in her late teens Marie changed 
her name to Marin, began living as a man and became engaged to marry a fellow 
maidservant Jeanne. Both Marin and Jeanne were charged with female sodomy,: with 
having committed lesbian acts. Furthermore Marin was charged with usurping masculine 
name and dress. At the trial, in 1601, medical examiners testified that Marin had female 
genitalia and his employers further bore witness to his regular menstrual periods. Jeanne, 
however, who was widowed with two children, testified that Marin had satisfied her 
sexually as much if not better than her deceased husband. Marin too testified that he 
became erect when aroused, but he declined to demonstrate this to the court.   
Both Jeanne and Marin were found guilty of unnatural acts. Marin was sentenced 
to be hanged and burned. Jeanne was sentenced to watch the execution, be whipped in 
public for three days, have her possessions confiscated and then be banished from 
Normandy. Following the trial one of the medical examiners examined Marin using a 
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different method. He became convinced Marin possessed a penis when, following 
extensive rubbing, thick masculine semen was ejaculated, from what had previously been 
considered a clitoris. The doctor reported his findings to the court. The original sentence 
was lifted from both Marin and Jeanne. Instead Marin was sentenced to dress as a woman 
and to refrain from sex with either men or women for four years. Ten years later, Marin 
was spotted wearing men’s clothes and sporting a thick beard.17 
If, as indicated by the dicta of de Bracton, Coke and Maimonides, hermaphroditism 
was accepted in society why was Marie/Marin brought before the court when s/he had 
chosen to marry in the male role and presumably intended to live in that role? Examining 
the alternative sentences handed down at the original trial and once the evidence of the 
post-trial examination had been adduced to court, sheds light on the matter. At the original 
trial, evidence of Marie’s menstrual cycle was deemed sufficient to determine her sex as 
female. Thus the proposed marriage was between two women and hence sufficiently 
offensive to the law to mandate a death sentence. However, once the evidence of the post-
trial examination was admitted to court, the fact of ejaculation was considered sufficient 
to call into question the sex of Marie/Marin and thus, potentially, the relationship between 
the accused persons was uncontroversial and heterosexual. Viewed from this perspective, 
it was Marie/Marin’s suspected lesbianism and not the fact of her hermaphroditism which 
was the cause of societal concern. An alternative reading of the case could be to do with 
Marie/Marin’s gender performance rather than her sexual orientation which was the cause 
for concern.18 Either way what is clear is that once the anxiety concerning 
gender/sexuality transgression was eliminated 
Prior to the French Revolution, sodomy was a serious crime handled by the religious 
courts, but it was not outlawed by the civil law of the land.19 This was reflected in the 
codification of the law, as neither the Penal code of 1791 nor the Napoleonic Code of 
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1810, mentions or criminalises private sexual acts between consenting adults over 21 
years of age. In England and Ireland, the civil law adopted this offence under cannon law 
in 1533 when the first civil law outlawing sodomy, the statute 25 Hen. VIII c. 6, was 
enacted.20 Under this statute acts considered sodomy were classed as felonies punishable 
by hanging. Prosecution under this Act was not solely confined to homosexual acts, but 
to anal intercourse in general as well as to acts of bestiality.21 
Michel Foucault offers as an explanation for this sudden interest in regulating 
sexuality the contention that changes made to the sacrament of penance by the Council 
of Trent (1545 – 1563), lead to increasing discourse on sexuality and hence that which 
had previously been confined to the private realm, became publicised.22 The increase in 
discourse about sex and sexuality became evident in the eighteenth century: the study of 
demographics began as a means of regulating the population. The sex lives of citizens 
became an important object of public scrutiny, as statistics regarding birth rates, fertility 
rates, illegitimate births, and so on became important for public use.23 Thus, sexuality 
became a matter of public interest: sex became something to be studied rationally, to be 
analysed, classified and understood as a statistical phenomenon. Laws prohibiting certain 
kinds of sex became tighter,24 studies of sex became more frequent, and the general 
awareness of sexuality was heightened leading to even more talk about sex.25  
 
Nineteenth Century and the Age of Gonads 
The publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of the Species greatly perturbed 
society in the nineteenth century.26 His theory of evolution held that males and females 
existed purely for procreative purposes, and were naturally selected to ensure the survival 
of the fittest and the continuation of the species. Thus the polarisation of males and 
females is the foundation on which life itself was based. The heterosexual male and 
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female were prioritised by society as the highest form of humanity as, uniquely, they were 
in a position to ensure the survival of the species through procreation.27  It can be argued 
that the prioritisation of a binary gender paradigm in an organised and intentional manner 
dates from this time.28 It was during the Victorian era that the recording of statistics 
relating to the births, marriages and deaths of the population was put on a statutory 
footing,29 the first definition of marriage as something exclusively the preserve of 
heterosexual men and women was handed down by a court,30 the law outlawing sodomy 
was restated afresh and reinterpreted as a prohibition on homosexuality and, although the 
death penalty was removed as a punishment, the crime was punishable by up to life 
imprisonment.31 Furthermore, the erasure of the hermaphrodite from both recognised civil 
society and from the public consciousness began.  
Foucault argues that the attempt to regulate sexuality and to eliminate degeneracy through 
natural selection, resulted in society becoming concerned with the instability of political-
sexual identities: hence the increase in prosecutions for homosexuality.32 Simultaneously, 
doctors were beginning to specialise, and gynaecology, which previously had the almost 
exclusively the preserve of the midwife, was becoming a specialisation in its own right.33 
Doctors began to discover and report in medical journals a number of physically 
hermaphroditic subjects. This can partly be attributed to the rise of gynaecology and as 
Dreger argues: ‘anxiety of sex roles probably also contributed to the rapid rise in medical 
reports of hermaphrodites by making physicians sensitive to their patients’ sexual 
identities, anatomies and practices.’34 
In an attempt to curtail hermaphroditism lest it amplify the social sexual confusion, 
biomedical experts sought a stable definition of male and female. In 1896, Blacker and 
Lawrence published an article in which they argued that it is the gonadal tissue, revealed 
as either testicular or ovarian upon microscopic examination, which is the true indicator 
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of an individual’s sex, regardless of any other anatomical factor.35 This argument received 
widespread acceptance by the medical community.36 Consequently a person who 
possessed testes would be labelled a male-pseudo-hermaphrodite regardless of how 
feminine they might be. This led to some cases of extreme social nonsense, such as that 
of L.S., a Parisian fashion model with testes, who was described as ‘frankly homosexual’ 
by doctors because she exclusively sexually desired men.37 
Therefore all people could be labelled as male or female even if ‘apparently and 
falsely’ hermaphroditic. It was only upon microscopic inspection of the gonads by many 
teams of experts that an individual could be declared a ‘true hermaphrodite’. Given that 
biopsies and exploratory surgery were extremely rare occurrences, in practice the only 
true hermaphrodite tended to be the dead and autopsied hermaphrodite.38 As a result of 
this new test, far fewer people met the criteria for diagnosis as a hermaphrodite regardless 
of what other ‘apparently’ hermaphroditic traits they might possess. Thus the erasure of 
the hermaphrodite from society began. 
 
Surgical Solutions 
With the advent of live biopsies in the early twentieth century it was no longer sustainable 
to adopt a gonadal definition of sex. William Blair Bell advanced the idea that when 
determining the sex of an apparent hermaphrodite, each case should be considered as a 
whole and the focus should not be exclusively on the gonads.39 He also suggested that in 
addition to determining the sex of an individual with ambiguous biology, doctors should 
help that diagnosis along: ‘[S]urgical procedures should in these special cases be carried 
out to establish more completely the obvious sex of the individual.’40 
Thus surgeons began to ‘disappear’ intersex individuals from society by surgically 
altering their physical appearance such that it more closely resembled the appearances of 
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males or females. Advances in medicine, particularly surgical techniques and hormonal 
treatments, made it possible to eradicate the external evidence of intersexuality and to 
‘make’ an individual either male or female. The most prolific proponent of this approach 
was Dr. John Money, who specialised in the psychology of sex at the Gender Identity 
Clinic of Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. He believed that in the nature 
versus nurture debate, the latter is paramount. Therefore, sexual identity is not a matter 
of biology, but rather a learned process. Any child can be taught to have a male or female 
identity, regardless of biological ‘fact’. So when treating an intersexed child, the 
assignment of sex is inconsequential, so long as the child is raised clearly and 
unequivocally as either male or female.41 Surprisingly his argument was, to a large extent, 
based on the study of one individual known as the John/Joan case.42 
 John was one of a set of identical twins born in 1965. At eight months old his 
penis was severely burned and completely lost during a routine circumcision. With little 
hope that it could be repaired, he parents ultimately turned to Dr Money who suggested a 
gender change. In July 1967, John underwent gender re-assignment surgery and was sent 
home as Joan. Her parents were under strict instruction from Money and the treatment 
team to keep her original sex a secret and to constantly reaffirm her feminine identity.  
The twins were cared for by a local psychiatric team under Money’s direction and were 
brought to Baltimore annually to be evaluated.43 Money reported that although she did 
exhibit some tomboyish traits, Joan’s parents were now successfully raising her as a 
typical girl.44 The John/Joan case was proclaimed a triumph, conclusive proof of the 
supremacy of nurture over nature. The existence of John’s twin, a genetically identical 
control who was a typical boy, convinced doctors that gender was a fiction of society. 
Intersex children could be raised as either male or female, providing the sex was assigned 
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before the crucial gender identity gate was reached. Thus genital normalisation and sexual 
assignment surgery became the standard treatment for intersex individuals. 
 Following the US example, other countries also began to practise routine gender 
assignment surgery on intersexed infants. The reconstruction of these children as either 
male or female contributed to the disappearance of intersex from the social consciousness. 
For decades the success of the John/Joan case was unquestioned despite the lack of any 
other corroborative research.45 No follow-up studies were ever done on adult intersex 
individuals who underwent such surgery as children.46 In the late 1990s, researchers 
attempting to challenge Money’s theories began to search for Joan, whom Money had 
reported was ‘lost to research’. The boy who was raised as a girl was now living as a man. 
Diamond and Sigmundson published an article in 1997 refuting the results of Money’s 
famous research.47 It was the publication of the eventual outcome of the John/Joan story 
that caused some practitioners to begin to reconsider the approach to the medical 
management of intersexuality they had been following.48 
  
Intersex in Modern Ireland 
Intersex has been the subject of very little official discussion since the creation of the Irish 
State. In fact prior to 2009 there was no mention of either intersex or hermaphrodite in 
any official text or sources from any public body. Where intersex has been mentioned the 
consideration thereof has been cursory at best.  The first mention of intersex was in a case 
before the High Court S v An Bord Uchtála in 2009.49 The case concerned a child born 
with an intersex condition who was the subject of a foreign adoption order and 
consequently noted in the Register of Foreign Adoptions as female. Upon closer medical 
examination when the child was brought to Ireland it was determined that he would most 
likely identify as male and thus his family decided to raise him as a boy. In support of this 
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decision they sought to have the gender marker on the Register of Foreign Adoption 
amended as the certificate therefrom would operate as a foundational identification 
document for their son especially as regards registration for school etc. An Bord Uchtála 
was of the opinion that, given the historical importance of the register, to change the 
record was beyond their power and refused to do so resulting in judicial review 
proceedings. The Court issued a ruling ordering the requested change be made. While this 
was the desired outcome for the individual litigants it is unsatisfactory for intersex 
individuals in general. The lack of a carefully considered judgment reduced the 
precedential value of the S case. Thus it is uncertain whether the legal recognition 
afforded to S would extend to another intersex person and it is less clear whether it might 
encompass someone who identifies outside the binary male/female gender paradigm. 
 The only legal cases to consider the parameters of legal gender identity in Ireland 
have occurred in the context of a transgender woman reeking to have her birth certificate 
altered to reflect her preferred identity as female.50 Dr Lydia Foy lost her first case in 
2002, the Court emphasising the importance of the register of births as a historical record: 
a ‘snapshot’ of a moment in time.51 Subsequent to a unanimous decision from the 
European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Goodwin v UK, that the persistent failure 
of English law to recognise the preferred gender identity of a transwoman amounted to a 
violation of her right to respect for her private and family life under Article 8 of the 
ECHR, Dr Foy brought fresh proceedings.52 Although she lost on the domestic legal 
points, Dr Foy won her argument that based on Goodwin Irish law violated her 
Convention right to respect for her private life. The ruling of the Court was historic as it 
was the first time that an Irish Court had issued a Declaration of Incompatibility between 
Irish law and the State’s legal obligations flowing from the ECHR under the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003.53 
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 What is interesting about the Foy case is that it adopted into Irish law the decision 
of the English High Court as to how legal gender ought to be determined. In Corbett v 
Corbett (1970) it was held that the legal gender of an individual was determined by the 
congruence of the chromosomes, gonads and genitals at birth.54 Thus the test has both 
biological and temporal aspects. In cases where this congruence is not present at birth the 
judge held that the genital sex ought to be determinative.55 However, given the importance 
of the birth moment in determining legal gender such a preference for genital appearance 
is reductive as it may restrict the gender category available to an intersex person whose 
condition is only discovered later in life or who does not identify with the gender the 
genital appearance might suggest. Consequently, in W v W (2000) the English High Court 
was willing to develop the Corbett test to find that advances in medical technology would 
enable Mrs W to be accepted as female in modern times and given she had asserted a 
female identity since the time she was able to choose her gender that this ought to be 
acknowledged.56 The Irish court in the Foy cases was silent on whether this variation on 
the Corbett test might be applicable in the context of Irish intersex individuals, although, 
given the practical resolution of the S case, it is reasonable to presume it would be 
persuasive if advanced in legal argument.57 
 The first mention of intersex from an official source in Ireland, not a court report, 
was contained in the Report of the Gender Recognition Advisory Group (GRAG) 
published in 2011.58 The Group had been convened to advise the Minister for Social 
Protection as to how best to introduce gender recognition legislation to Ireland. The 
Group declined to recommend that space to acknowledge intersex lived experience be 
created within any proposed legislative scheme as to do so was both beyond its remit and 
required more research and medical expertise than was available to it.59 Thus the report 
amounts to a knowing refusal to engage with the complex challenge intersex poses for 
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the law.  The various legislative proposals currently before the Oireachtas make that more 
meaningful engagement. Both the private members bills, the Gender Recognition Bill 
2013 and the Legal Recognition of Gender Bill 2013,60 adopt a self-declaration model 
where individuals inform the State as to their preferred gender of legal recognition where 
that differs from that registered on the birth certificate. No additional proof is needed to 
ground an application for recognition. In this these bills propose a return to the historical 
method of self-declaration as evidence in the writings of Coke. Such a self-declaration 
model is in accordance with best practice in international human rights discourse as 
evidenced in the Argentinian law on gender recognition.61 
Contrastingly, the General Scheme for the Gender Recognition Bill 2013 proposed 
by the Minister for Social Protection would require applicants (who must be at least 18 
years of age) to provide a supporting statement from their primary treating physician 
confirming that they have transitioned or are transitioning to their ‘acquired gender.’62 In 
restricting the ambit of the recognition rights to those over 18, the Government’s proposed 
scheme would exclude intersex children from amending their official identification 
documentation, which was the very defect the S case was brought to address. On a related 
note, the language of ‘transition’ strongly implies that the rights in the legislation will be 
framed in a binary context and those seeking recognition outside this paradigm will be 
unsuccessful. It was the lacuna leaving intersex children out of the ambit of the potential 
rights under the proposed legislative scheme outlined by the Government that prompted 
most discussion on intersex inclusion therein. The Report of the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on their examination of the scheme identifies these concerns repeatedly.63 In 
particular it notes the concerns raised by the Ombudsman for Children’s Office (OCO) in 
its report to the committee.64 The OCO report detailed the State’s obligations under 
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international human rights law in this regard and concluded that any right to recognition 
enjoyed by an adult under Article 8 ECHR extended equally to children.65  
As a result of these investigations the Committee recommended that the age limit 
for applicants be reduced to 16 years with provisions to address the say-to-day concerns 
of those under that age. It also recommended that the criterion concerning evidence of 
transition be reconsidered in order to ensure that it does not stigmatise applicants.66 
Although the recommendations of the Committee do not specifically address intersex, 
read together with the discussions contained in their report, they do suggest a more 
inclusive acknowledgment of the lived reality of intersex lives than has existed in 
previous Government sponsored discourse. Whether these recommendations will become 
part of the final draft legislation remains to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the evolving response of law to the existence of intersex 
individuals. It demonstrates that, historically, law acknowledged the legitimacy of 
hermaphrodites. The chapter has argued that as medical knowledge and interest in 
regulating bodies and sexuality increased, intersex identity was rendered illegitimate. The 
requirement in birth registration legislation that all children be declared to the State as 
being either male or female shortly after birth caused the law to be complicit in the erasure 
of intersex from legal and social consciousness. Cases such as S and W demonstrate that 
a practical and pragmatic approach by the courts can alleviate the difficulties of a system 
of gender recognition stymied by the prioritisation of the moment of birth as definitive in 
the determination of a person’s legal gender. Nonetheless, it is in legislation that the true 
transformative potential of the law lies. Intersex identity was delegitimized by the 
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introduction of birth registration legislation and it is through the introduction of rights 
realising gender recognition legislation that intersex identity can be re-legitimised. 
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